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Policing in Insects
A recent study shows that, in social insects where workers suppress or
‘police’ the reproduction of nestmate workers, only a subset of workers
act as police. This confirms that policing can serve a collective rather
than a selfish interest.Andrew F.G. Bourke
Ambrose Bierce [1] defined a legal
oath as ‘‘a solemn appeal to the
Deity, made binding upon the
conscience by a penalty for
perjury’’. Insect societies have no
laws or religion, but the altruism of
their workers, who labour for the
colony even to the point of
abstaining from reproduction, may
similarly be reinforced by
punishment or coercion.
Hamilton’s kin selection theory [2]
showed the fundamental basis of
reproductive altruism in workers to
be their genetic relatedness to the
reproductives (new queens and
males) that they rear. The sharing of
genes inherent in kinship means
that raising relatives promotes the
spread of genes for altruism. Kin
selection theory therefore explains
altruism not as something imposed
on workers, for example by the
queen, but as a genetically selfish
behaviour performed in the
workers’ own evolutionary
interests.
Ratnieks [3] added an important
refinement to this picture. Because
of haplodiploidy in ants, bees and
wasps — whereby female workers
and queens develop from fertilized
eggs and are diploid, while males
develop from unfertilized eggs and
are haploid — even workers
incapable of mating are potentially
able to produce their own male
offspring [4]. Ratnieks [3] showed
that the relatedness structure of
insect colonies could create
selection for workers to prevent
their fellow workers from
reproducing. He predicted such
‘worker policing’ to stem, not from
direct reproductive competition
between individual workers, but
from selection for genes for
policing performed in the workers’
collective interest. In the honey bee
Apis mellifera, workers were
subsequently found to performpolicing either by selectively
consuming nestmate workers’
eggs [5] or by attacking nestmate
workers with activated ovaries [6].
These forms of worker policing
have since been documented in
many species of ants, bees and
wasps [7]. Now a new study by
van Zweden et al. [8] has
demonstrated that, in the ant
Pachycondyla inversa, some
non-laying workers specialize in
policing their nestmates. So
a division of labour exists among
workers for policing, as it does for
everyday labouring tasks such
as foraging, brood-rearing and
nest-construction [9,10]. In
effect, this ant has exchanged
a Neighbourhood Watch scheme,
in which everyone keeps an eye on
everyone else, for a professional
police force. This discovery
supports the idea that policing
evolves because it serves
a collective interest.
In the honey bee, the relatedness
structure of the colony promotes
worker policing because, as
a result of the queen’s high mating
frequency, each worker is related
to males in the order: own sons,
relatedness 0.5; queen’s sons,
relatedness 0.25; other workers’
sons, relatednessw0.125. This
means that, given policing,
each worker effectively rears its
more closely related brothers
(queen’s sons) instead of less
closely related sons of other
workers [3]. Of course, any one
worker would still have greater
fitness if it could produce all the
colony’s males (relatedness 0.5).
But a single worker is unlikely to
have the power tomonopolizemale
production. By contrast, mutual
policing among the workforce as
a whole is entirely achievable. So
policing occurs because workers,
acting as a collective, not only gain
fitness but also hold the required
monopoly of practical power. Laterresearch showed that efficient
policing selects for workers not to
attempt reproduction in the first
place [11]. So the altruism of
workers in species with policing
may stem from relatedness initially
but be backed up by the possibility
of direct prevention of
reproduction.
Ratnieks [3] also showed that
policing could be positively
selected in the absence of
relatedness benefits if it made
colonies more productive.
Evidence supports both
relatedness and productivity
benefits as important influences on
the occurrence of policing [12,13].
Low frequencies of workers with
active ovaries in species with
effective policing and low
relatedness have also confirmed
a dual effect of relatedness and
policing on worker reproduction
[14]. An alternative reason for
policing is direct selfishness.
Perhaps policing workers are
themselves reproductive and aim
to suppress the egg-laying of
rivals. Such ‘corrupt’ policing
is suspected in the wasp
Dolichovespula sylvestris [15]. It
is essentially identical to the
dominance behaviour familiar from
some other social insects (for
example [16]) and other social
animals altogether [17], in which
rank reflects reproductive status.
The new research by van Zweden
et al. [8] advances our
understanding of worker policing
by establishing that, in a system
where policing is not ‘corrupt’,
policing is subject to division of
labour.
Pachycondyla inversa (Figure 1)
is a large ponerine ant found in
Brazil. Colonies contain a few
dozen workers and one to several
unrelated, multiply-mated queens,
and so have a relatedness structure
promoting policing [18]. Using
captive nests with individually
marked workers, van Zweden et al.
[8] performed two experiments. In
the first, colonies were split by
separating some of the workers
from the main nest, which
contained the queen or queens,
with a wire screen. The separated
workers activated their ovaries
and began to lay eggs. The
investigators then reintroduced
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R520Figure 1. A worker of the ant Pachycondyla inversa. Photo: Jelle van Zweden.these workers to the main nest
one at a time and recorded the
identities of any resident workers
attacking them. Later, they
assessed the reproductive status
of all workers byovarian dissection.
In the second experiment, the
investigators added queen-laid or
worker-laid eggs singly to target
colonies. They then recorded the
fate of the eggs and the identities of
the workers handling them.
In the first experiment, the
reintroduced workers with the
most active ovaries were attacked
most frequently by the resident
workers, suggesting that the
function of the attacks was to
police reproduction. Policing
workers lacked active ovaries and
so were not behaving ‘corruptly’. In
addition, although many resident
workers participated in policing,
the distribution of policing attacks
among them was highly uneven,
with some never policing and
others performing more policing
than expected by chance.
In the second experiment, as
expected [18], workers from the
target colonies selectively ate
worker-laid eggs, but the
distribution of egg-eating among
them was again uneven, although
less strongly so than the
distribution of policing byaggressive attacks in the first
experiment. Tellingly, in both
experiments, the first worker to
encounter an introduced
reproductive worker or a
worker-laid egg was usually not the
worker that eventually policed it (by
attacking or eating, respectively);
there were few citizen’s arrests.
Overall, the study showed that
some non-reproductive workers
are non-policers, whereas others
specialize in policing. So policing is
subject to a division of labour,
either in its own right or through
being associated with other tasks
or suites of tasks for which
a division of labour exists [8].
Division of labour evolves in
insect societies because it
improves colony efficiency among
tasks benefiting the colony as
a whole [19]. The findings of van
Zweden et al. [8] are therefore
consistent with the idea that
policing can reflect the evolutionary
interests of workers acting as
acollective.Presumably theneedto
keep policing effective prevents the
proportion of workers serving as
police from falling too low. In human
societies, law-abiding citizens
accept that society requires
policing and that it is more efficient
if just some members of society
become police. This way, policingis also subjected to a division of
labour. In social insects, despite
their lack of laws and religion, it
appears that natural selection has
fashioned a similar system.
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